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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
ABELARDO DOMINGUEZ GOMEZ, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
No. 38889-2011 
APPELLANT'S RESPONSE 
TO RESPONDENT'S 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
COMES NOW, Appellant Abelardo Gomez and offers this Response to Respondent's 
Brief in Support of Petition for Review. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Mr. Gomez entered guilty pleas in accord with a binding Rule 11 agreement in the 
District Court. The plea agreement made no reference to restitution. R 68-69. Likewise, 
nothing was said at the change of plea hearing about Mr. Gomez agreeing to pay restitution as 
part of the plea agreement. Tr. 1113/09. Well after the guilty plea was entered and even well 
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after the sentencing hearing, the State presented an order for $129,534.097 (sic) in restitution, 
which the Court signed without a hearing. R 90-92. The order infonned Mr. Gomez that he 
could request relief within 42 days pursuant to the Civil Rules, which he did, when he filed a pro 
se notice of appeal. R 90-97. 
The Court of Appeals, applying State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), held 
that fundamental error had occurred and vacated the restitution order in a published decision. 
State v. Gomez, No. 36545, Slip Op. March 25, 2011. 
The State filed a Petition for Review arguing that the Court of Appeals' decision was in 
conflict with applicable decisions by this Court and the United States Supreme Court. The State 
argues that the Court of Appeals' decision was inconsistent with Perry, and further argues that 
even if this Court reviews the improper order of restitution, that it should find that the State did 
not breach the plea agreement, because the amount of restitution was so large that not mentioning 
it in the plea agreement meant that the State intended to collect it all along. Respondent's Brief 
in Support of Petition for Review, page 17. The State further argues that even ifit breached the 
plea agreement that it should be able to benefit from this breach by giving Mr. Gomez the 
"opportunity" to withdraw his plea so that it can either charge him with the many offenses it 
previously dismissed and open him to federal prosecution or extract the restitution it failed to 
originally include in the plea agreement from him as the new price for him retaining the benefits 
of the bargain the State previously made. Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, 
pages 18-21. 
Mr. Gomez asks this Court to apply State v. Perry and hold that the State's breach of the 
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plea agreement was fundamental error and that the proper remedy is to vacate the improperly 
entered restitution order. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
The State's procedural history of the case in its Brief to this Court is accurate, but 
incomplete. 
The State did not note in its brief that when the terms of the Rule 11 agreement were 
initially stated to the District Court, it did not mention its intent to seek restitution. Tr. 116109; 
Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pages 3-4. Likewise, the State did not 
note that when it entered into the written Rule 11 plea agreement, it again declined to articulate 
its intent to seek restitution. R 68-70; Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, 
pages 3-4. And, again, the State did not note it at the change of plea hearing, when the District 
Court specifically questioned Mr. Gomez about what he and the State had agreed to in the plea 
agreement. The State remained silent and did not verbalize to either Mr. Gomez or the Court its 
intention to seek nearly $130,000 in restitution. Tr. 1113/09; Respondent's Brief in Support of 
Petition for Review pages 4-5. 
The State also did not note that the District Court indicated to Mr. Gomez that it intended 
to accept the Rule 11 plea absent something concerning being brought out in the Presentence 
Investigation Report. Tr. 1113/09, p. 5, In. 11 - 15. It did not note that the PSI does not include 
any statements about restitution. PSI, Exhibit on Appeal. And, the State did not note that when 
the sentencing hearing commenced, the Court did not tell Mr. Gomez that it was rejecting the 
Rule 11 agreement. Tr. 3116109. 
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While the State asserts that Mr. Gomez "did not object" at the sentencing hearing when it 
referred to an intent to seek restitution in the future, the State did not point out that at the 
sentencing hearing it did not actually request restitution or submit a restitution order and any 
objection would clearly have been premature. Tr. 3116/09; Respondent's Brief in Support of 
Petition for Review pages 6-7. 
While the State did refer to the restitution order being entered after sentencing, it did not 
note that this order was entered a month after Mr. Gomez was sentenced without any sort of 
hearing or apparently even any notice to Mr. Gomez. ROA, R 4; Respondent's Brief at pages 7-
8. And, the State did not note that the restitution order does not indicate in any way that it was 
ever served on Mr. Gomez's counsel. R 90-92; Respondent's Brief at pages 7-8. Indeed, it 
appears that the order probably never was served on counsel, because Mr. Gomez filed a pro se 
notice of appeal which does not include any statement by Mr. Gomez to indicate that he believed 
he was still represented by trial counsel. R 93-97. See also, Letter regarding Notice of Appeal 
received 5/22/09, Exhibit on Appeal, where also, there is no indication that Mr. Gomez 
continued to be represented by counsel. 
In the subsection of its brief on the course of proceedings in the Court of Appeals, the 
State asserts that the Court and the State had "substantial discussion" in Mr. Gomez's presence 
regarding the amount of restitution and the process to be followed to determine the amount. 
Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pages 8-9. This assertion is not 
accompanied by a reference to the record. Moreover, the only "discussion" of restitution in Mr. 
Gomez's presence took place at the sentencing hearing. There, the prosecutor made a reference 
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to $56,000 in buy money. Tr. 3116109, p. 7, In. 1 - 4. The Court later stated, "And, you'll need 
time to submit on a restitution order?" The prosecutor responded, "Yes, Judge, I still have to 
figure out manpower." Tr. 3116109, p. 9, In. 24 - p. 10, In. 2. At the end of the sentencing 
hearing, the Court stated that there would be a matter of restitution to be submitted to the Court 
and that there might be a dispute about the amount, and if so, there would be a 42-day window in 
which Mr. Gomez could inform his counsel. Tr. 3116109, p. 13, In. 25 - p. 14, In. 5. While the 
State asserts that this was substantial discussion of the amount of restitution and the process to be 
followed to determine the amount, the limited information shared about restitution at sentencing 
was that the State would be asking for restitution some time in the future and that Mr. Gomez 
would be allowed to dispute that, if the State ever did actually present the matter. Once the State 
actually did obtain a restitution order, Mr. Gomez did dispute it. R 93-97. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is the breach of a plea agreement by the State fundamental error that may be addressed 
in a direct appeal? 
2. Did a breach ofthe plea agreement occur in this case when substantial restitution was 
ordered in violation of the plea agreement? 
3. lfthe State breached the plea agreement, is the proper remedy to vacate the restitution 
order, or is the proper remedy to allow the State to benefit from its own breach of the agreement 
by forcing Mr. Gomez to either accede to the State's breach and pay the State restitution in 
violation of the plea agreement or withdraw his pleas and give up the agreement in totality? 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. The State's Breach of the Plea Agreement Violated Mr. Gomez's State and 
Federal Constitutional Rights to Due Process and is Subject to Review as 
Fundamental Error 
In Perry, this Court set out the analysis to be applied in cases of unobjected-to error: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or obvious, without 
the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, 
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; 
and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's 
substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the 
outcome of the trial proceedings. 
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted). 
The State, relying on Puckett v. United States, _ U.S. _, 129 S.Ct. 1423 (2009), 
argues that the error in ordering restitution in violation of the plea agreement was not "plain," 
"clear," or "obvious." Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pages 11-18. 
Puckett is a federal case applying the federal plain error standard of review to the issue of 
whether the government had broken a plea agreement by backing away from a promised request 
for a three-level reduction in Puckett's offense level. U.S. at _, 129 S.Ct. at 1427-8. 
Puckett argued both before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and before the Supreme Court that 
this breach of the plea agreement (a breach the government conceded early in the proceedings) 
should be subject to a more favorable standard of review than plain error. However, both the 
Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court held the breach was subject to plain error review. Id 
Plain error review involves four steps, some of which are analogous to the fundamental 
error review established by Perry. Specifically, plain error requires: 
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1) there must be an en-or or defect - some sort of "[ d]eviation from a legal rule" 
that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., waived, by the 
appellant; 
2) the en-or must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; 
3) the en-or must have affected the appellant's substantial rights, which in the 
ordinary case means he or she must demonstrate that it "affected the outcome of 
the district court proceedings." 
4) if the above three prongs are satisfied, the court of appeals has the discretion to 
remedy the error, discretion which should be exercised only if the en-or "seriously 
affect[ s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." 
Puckett, _ U.S. at _, 129 S.Ct. at 1429, quoting and citing, United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 
725, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (1993). This standard of review is set out in FRCrP 52(b). 
What Puckett says is that an unobjected-to breach of a plea agreement is subject to plain 
error review. Id. The Court of Appeals' decision in Mr. Gomez's case is consistent - applying a 
fundamental en-or analysis to the question of the validity of the restitution order entered in 
violation of the plea agreement. 
The State wishes this Court to find that under Puckett an error in violating a plea 
agreement is not plain, clear, or obvious. Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review 
pages 11-16. However, in Puckett, everyone (Mr. Puckett, the government, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court) agreed that the government had violated 
the plea agreement and that this was en-or and indeed obvious en-or, which satisfied the first two 
prongs of the plain error standard. Puckett was denied relief, not because there was no clear 
error, but rather because he did not demonstrate as required under the third prong of the test that 
the en-or affected his substantial rights (specifically caused him prejudice). Given that he had 
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committed additional offenses between the date of the plea and the date of sentencing, even if the 
government had made the agreed upon request for an reduction in offense level, it would not 
have been granted and therefore, there was no showing of prejudice. 
In drawing this Court's attention to Puckett, the State does not mention the many Idaho, 
federal, and other states' cases which hold that restitution may not be imposed after a defendant 
has pled guilty in reliance upon a plea agreement which does not include payment of restitution 
as one of the tenns of the agreement: State v. Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 861 P.2d 1234 (Ct. App. 
1993)( order of restitution following defendant's guilty plea was invalid in absence of any 
stipulation as to restitution); State v. Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 64 P.3d 335 (Ct. App. 2003)(State 
violated plea agreement when it requested order of restitution after juvenile admitted guilt to 
charge of disturbing the peace in reliance on agreement, since nothing in agreement carried 
implication that order of restitution would be included); Hayes v. State, 143 Idaho 88,94, 137 
P.3d 475,481 (CLApp. 2006)(a defense attorney's failure to object to the State's request for 
restitution at or after sentencing when the defendant was not previously informed of that 
consequence may constitute deficient perfonnance); State v. O'Connor, 146 Ariz. 16,703 P.2d 
563 (Ariz.App. 1985)(restitution of$5840 could not be imposed when the written plea agreement 
made no mention of restitution); State v. Cameron, 30 Wash.App. 229, 234, 633 P.2d 901, 905 
(1981 )(where defendant was not infonned of possibility of restitution when he entered plea, but 
plea was otherwise voluntary, appropriate remedy is to strike restitution order); United States v. 
Garcia, 698 F.2d 31, 36 (1 st Cir. 1983)( restitution was not part of plea agreement and to imply 
such a condition post-plea and sentencing would be to work a material change in the plea 
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agreement); United States v. Burruezo, 704 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1983)(imposition of restitution 
created a material change in the plea bargain); United States v. Hawthorne, 806 F.2d 493, 499 
(3rd Cir. 1986)(the government must, in the course of negotiating the plea, inform the defendant 
of the possibility that restitution will be required so as to afford the defendant a full opportunity 
to adequately assess all the consequences prior to accepting a plea bargain); United States v. 
Runck, 601 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015, 100 S.Ct. 665, 62 L.Ed.2d 
644 (1980)(restitution order of $87,400 improperly ordered because it should have been made a 
part of the plea bargain made known and agreed to by the bargainers); United States v. Kamer, 
781 F.2d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 (substantial restitution is material 
enough to demand express inclusion in a plea agreement). 
After discussing Puckett, but without mentioning that in Puckett the Supreme Court 
found that breach of a plea agreement was a clear and obvious error, the State argues that there 
was not clear error in Mr. Gomez's case. The State bases its argument on its assertion that it is 
the duty of the appellate court to ascertain the intent of the parties and because the plea 
agreement did not specifically prohibit the State from seeking restitution, and because Mr. 
Gomez did not object in the District Court, it should be determined that it was Mr. Gomez's and 
the State's intention that restitution be ordered. Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for 
Review, page 15-16. 
The State cites no authority for its argument. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263,923 
P.2d 966, 970 (1 996)(argument must be supported by authority). However, this Court has 
recently discussed the applicable analysis - an analysis unlike that proposed by the State. 
9 - APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REVIEW 9 
In determining whether the State has breached a plea agreement a court must 
examine the language of the plea agreement and where the language of that plea 
agreement is ambiguous, those ambiguities shall be resolved in favor of the 
defendant. 
State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 226 P.3d 535 (2010), citing State v. Fuhriman, 137 Idaho 741, 
745,52 P.3d 886, 89 (et. App. 2002). 
Applying the Peterson analysis, the first question is whether the plea agreement is 
ambiguous. It is not. The State did not include a requirement that Mr. Gomez pay restitution. 
Having failed to make payment of restitution a condition of his guilty plea, the State forfeited the 
ability to later seek restitution. 
However, for the sake of argument assume the agreement is ambiguous as to the 
imposition of restitution. If the agreement is ambiguous, the ambiguity must be resolved in favor 
of Mr. Gomez, and it must be found that the agreement does not include imposition of restitution. 
Id. 
The State also seems to be relying on defense counsel's failure to comment when the 
State began talking about restitution long after the plea agreement had been made and Mr. 
Gomez had entered his pleas to bootstrap a claim that the written plea agreement did include a 
provision that the State would be seeking restitution. Respondent's Brief at pages 17 - 18. 
However, all defense counsel's silence indicates is that counsel did not feel the need to say 
anything because the State had not actually offered or sought any restitution order at the time of 
its comments so any objection would be premature and unnecessary in light of the clear terms of 
the plea agreement. 
In summary, the plea agreement was a written Rule 11 binding plea agreement. The State 
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did not include any provision requiring payment of restitution. Its later breach of the agreement 
was clear error under both state and federal precedent and may be addressed under Perry's 
fundamental error analysis. 
B. The Restitution Order Was Entered in Violation of the Plea Agreement 
After arguing that the error in entering a restitution order in violation of the plea 
agreement should not be heard on appeal, the State argues that there was in fact no error in 
entering the restitution order in violation of the plea agreement. Respondent's Brief in Support 
of Petition for Review pages 16-18. 
To support this argument, the State again urges this Court to overlook the analysis set out 
in Peterson, which applied in Mr. Gomez's case would hold that either the plea agreement was 
not ambiguous and restitution is not allowed, or that the plea agreement is ambiguous and that 
the ambiguity must be resolved against the State, again disallowing restitution. Rather, the State 
asks this Court to look to the intent of the parties - an intent the State says was for Mr. Gomez to 
plead guilty and then accept any amount of restitution imposed without question. The State 
argues that the very significant size of the restitution sought indicates that everyone intended Mr. 
Gomez should pay it. Respondent's Briefin Support of Petition for Review, page 17. Under this 
reasoning, had the State sought restitution in a small amount like $10 or $20, the Court should 
find that is a violation of the plea agreement because the amount is so small that the parties could 
not have assumed it would be owing. However, once the amount tops some large number, in this 
case, over $129,000, the State would have this Court find the State's silence on the matter 
indicates there had been a meeting ofthe minds prior to entry ofthe plea and Mr. Gomez had 
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agreed to pay without limit. 
In making its argument, the State points out Mr. Gomez did not speak out at the 
sentencing hearing when the State first brought up restitution, urging this as indicative of an 
earlier meeting of the minds that part of his plea agreement was the payment of such a significant 
sum of money. Of course, at this point, the agreement had been made and did not include 
restitution and the State could not retroactively alter it by simply stating it was going to seek 
restitution some time in the future. And, indeed, any objection at that point would have been 
premature. 
The party who actually stood silent when the silence was relevant is the State. It stood 
silent about its intent to seek restitution at the time the plea agreement was negotiated and signed; 
it stood silent in the plea hearing, not alerting Mr. Gomez or the Court to its intent regarding 
restitution; and it even stood partially silent at the sentencing hearing, when it alluded to asking 
for $56,000 sometime in the future - never revealing even then that it intended to ask for over 
twice that substantial sum after Mr. Gomez was locked safely away in the penitentiary and no 
longer represented by counsel. 
Having stood silent throughout the execution of the plea agreement and the taking of the 
plea, the State's claim that the parties intended the plea agreement to include imposition of 
restitution of over $129,000 is not well grounded. Peterson, supra. 
C. The Appropriate Remedy is Vacation of the Restitution Order 
The State argues that if this Court finds it breached the plea agreement by seeking the 
restitution order, Mr. Gomez should be given two choices: 1) lose a substantial benefit of his 
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agreement with the State and pay the improperly imposed restitution; or 2) lose all the benefits of 
his agreement with the State and be forced to withdraw his pleas and face the possibility of 
dismissed charges being refiled by the State and new charges being filed by the federal 
government. Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review page 18-21. 
When a plea agreement has been violated by the State, as a remedy a court may order 
specific performance of the agreement or may permit the defendant to withdraw the plea. 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,262 (1971); Doe, 138 Idaho at 411,64 P.3d at 337, State 
v. Horkley, 125 Idaho 860, 865, 876 P.2d 142,147 (Ct.App. 1994). 
Courts have repeatedly ordered specific performance in instances where withdrawal of the 
guilty plea would be unjust because it would work a great disadvantage to the defendant as a 
result of the State's wrongdoing. In State v. Doe, specific performance was ordered . 
. . . the State has received the benefit of its bargain. It would therefore be unjust 
to merely allow Doe to withdraw his guilty plea and face the possibility of being 
tried and resentenced for the same offense. A remedy of specific performance, on 
the other hand, will hold the State to its agreement, give Doe the terms he 
bargained for, and bring this case to an end. Accordingly, we reverse the order for 
restitution but do not otherwise disturb the judgment of conviction. 
138 Idaho at 411, 64 P.3d at 337. Likewise in Peterson, 148 Idaho at 597,226 P.3d at 539, this 
Court ordered specific performance rather than withdrawal of the plea. And, in Banuelos, 124 
Idaho at 573,861 P.2d at 1238, the proper remedy for failure to advise regarding restitution was 
to strike the restitution order. 
In this case, as in Doe, the State obtained the benefit of its bargain. It obtained multiple 
drug convictions without having to go to the expense of proving its case. It obtained a term of 
incarceration that it bargained for and obviously believed was an appropriate resolution of the 
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case. As in Doe the proper remedy is that the State be held to its bargain, the benefits of which it 
has already obtained, and the restitution order be vacated. See also, State v. Rutherford, 107 
Idaho 910, 916, 693 P.2d 11 12,1118 (Ct.App. 1985)(specific performance is the appropriate 
remedy for the breach of a plea agreement where the defendant has not sought withdrawal of his 
plea.) 
The State has not cited and cannot cite any case to support its argument that when it 
violates a plea agreement, it should be allowed to either force the defendant to accede to its 
improper demands (in this case, demands for a substantial sum of money) or to face further state 
and federal criminal prosecution. See State v. Zichko, supra. 
However, the result the State is seeking would set a dangerous precedent. It would create 
perverse incentives for the State to breach plea agreements after sentencing. Whenever the State 
had second thoughts about a case it had negotiated, it could simply bring in a large wrongful 
restitution order which would either force the defendant to submit or lose the plea agreement. 
This would seriously undermine the willingness of those charged with crimes to negotiate with 
the State. Providing disincentives to settlement of cases is not in anyone's interests. 
Moreover, such a result would be, as the Court of Appeals stated in its opinion in this 
case, unjust. Slip Op. at page 8. Such a result would be so unjust as to be a violation of the state 
and federal constitutional guarantees of due process. Due process is at its core justice, Buchalter 
v. People o/State o/New York, 319 U.S. 427, 428,63 S.Ct. 1129,1130 (1943), and it is not 
justice that the result of the State engaging in wrongdoing should be that Mr. Gomez be faced 
with either paying the State money wrongfully demanded or having to withdraw his pleas. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Fundamental error occurred in the entry of the restitution order in this case. Mr. Gomez 
respectfully asks this Court to vacate the improper order. 
DATED this~ of June, 2011 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorneys for Abelardo Gomez 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on June k, 2011, I caused two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing document to be: 
--../mailed 
hand delivered 
faxed 
to: Rebekah Cude 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Deborah Whipple 
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